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Solving the Parents Involved Paradox
Lino A. Gragliat
The Supreme Court's decision in Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 11 (Parents Involved) presents the
seeming paradox that the Constitution can on one day require a school
district to take drastic measures, including busing students across a giant
school district to increase racial integration in schools, and then prohibit
school districts from taking even the mildest measures, such as using
race as a tie-breaker in making student assignments, on the next. How, a
rational observer must wonder, can this be possible? The answer is that,
as usual in the making of "constitutional law," the Constitution has noth-
ing to do with it. It is the entirely logical, though paradoxical, result of a
long-established irrational and deceptive system of lawmaking by the
Supreme Court on the subject of race and the schools. 2 Because the re-
quirement of integration was falsely and illogically justified as only a
remedy for segregation, opponents of compulsory integration can find
the requirement inapplicable in any given case by simply pointing out
that there is no segregation to be remedied, as they did in Parents In-
volved.
I. THE BRoWN DECISION
The explanation begins with the Supreme Court's 1954 decision in
Brown v. Board of Education prohibiting school racial segregation and
the assignment of students to different schools on the basis of race. 3 It
soon became clear that Brown actually prohibited all segregation and
official racial discrimination, including segregation of beaches, golf
t Dalton Cross Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law.
1. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
2. For a full discussion, see LINO A. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE: THE SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS ON RACE AND THE SCHOOLS (Cornell UP 1976).
3. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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courses, and buses, even though they have nothing to do with education. 4
The Court could not and did not try to enforce Brown as to school segre-
gation,5 however, because the states of the Deep South had the option of
making the holding a nullity or worse by simply closing their public
schools. 6 Segregation came to a sudden and complete end ten years later
when Congress enacted the 1964 Civil Rights Act authorizing the De-
partment of Justice to sue to enforce Brown and providing for the cut-off
of federal funds to school districts that failed to end segregation. 7 Con-
gress in effect ratified and made effective its understanding, shared by
all, of the principle of Brown: a prohibition of all official racial discrimi-
nation.
School racial segregation quickly came to an end as a result of the
1964 Act, but racial separation did not. The residential racial separation
that existed in all urban areas with large black populations meant that
race-neutral neighborhood assignment would result in many predomi-
nantly black schools. Therefore, what was in fact an historic achievement
soon came to be seen by integration activists as a disappointment.8 The
effect of ending segregation in heavily black school districts (such as
those in Washington, D.C., St. Louis, Atlanta, and New Orleans) was not
only a failure to end racial separation, but sometimes even to increase it
as whites quickly fled the public school systems.9 It became clear that
compliance with Brown would not result in the utopia of racially "bal-
anced" schools (i.e., schools with the district's black student population
spread out more or less evenly). Therefore, the activists concluded that it
4. See Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) affg 142 F. Supp. 707 (D.C. Ala. 1956) (buses);
Mayor and City Council v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) aff g 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955 (public
beaches and bathhouses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955), rev'ing 223 F.2d 93 (5th
Cir. 1955) (municipal golf courses).
5. Instead of imposing a simple and obvious requirement that students be assigned to schools
without regard to race, the Court put off the question of "remedy" for reargument the following year.
Then, in Brown v. Board of Ed., (Brown I1), 349 U.S. 294 (1955), it again refused to require that
segregation be ended at once (at the beginning of the next school year) or within any stated time
period, requiring, instead, that it be ended only "as soon as practicable" and "with all deliberate
speed." Id. at 300-01.
6. See Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (laws requiring public education re-
pealed and 1959 order to end segregation met by closing the schools in just one county, which Court
held could not be done).
7. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 2000 a-h (2000)).
8. See United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966), aff'd en
banc 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied 389 U.S. 840 (1967) (non-racial assignment of stu-
dents to schools does not satisfy the Brown requirement).
9. See Alexander Bickel, The Decade of School Desegregation: Progress and Prospects, 64
COLUM. L. REv. 193 (1964).
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was time to take drastic action: to move from prohibiting segregation to
requiring increased integration, even though this meant requiring rather
than prohibiting race discrimination in apparent violation of Brown.
II. THE DE JURE-DE FACTO DISTINCTION
In 1968, the Supreme Court, led as usual by Justice Brennan, de-
cided to make this move in Green v. County School Board.'o Green, not
Brown, is the source of our current constitutional law of race discrimina-
tion. 1 Although the Court decided to make the move from prohibiting
segregation to requiring integration (one of the most daring, ambitious,
and ill-conceived in its history), it could not, for many reasons, make it
openly. The Court, therefore, denied that it was imposing a requirement
of integration for its own sake, applicable to school racial separation eve-
rywhere in the nation.12 The Constitution, the Court has repeatedly reas-
sured the North and West, is not offended by a school district with all-
black and all-white schools. 13 It insisted that the requirement was some-
thing very different: merely "desegregation," the undoing or "remedy-
ing" of the segregation prohibited by Brown. 14
Thus was born out of necessity the de jure-de facto distinction
15
that is the essential basis of our current constitutional law of race dis-
crimination, and to understanding Parents Involved The distinction,
however, is both dishonest in that the supposed "desegregation" require-
ment has been limited to undoing de jure segregation, and senseless in
that the cause of existing school racial separation does not seem related
to the benefits expected from compulsory racial mixing.
A. Advantages of De Jure-De Facto
Creating the de jure-de facto distinction and insisting that the re-
quirement was not integration as such, but only desegregation, had many
10. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
11. No one argues whether segregation should be permitted, only whether further steps to
increase integration should be required or permitted.
12. See Green, 391 U.S. at 437 (the argument that the Court is "requiring 'compulsory integra-
tion' ... ignores the thrust of Brown II.").
13. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) ("That there are both predomi-
nantly black and predominantly white schools in a community is not alone violative of the Equal
Protection Clause.").
14. All the Court was doing, it insisted in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd of Educ., 402
U.S. 1, 5 (1971), for example, was "implementing Brown L"
15. For example, the distinction between racial segregation explicitly required by a law (de
jure) and racial separation occurring for other reasons simply as a fact (de facto).
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advantages for the Court. First, this distinction made it appear that the
requirement would necessarily be confined to the South, where there had
been dejure segregation, not to the nation as a whole. It also seemed to
mean that the requirement would come to an end once its limited purpose
of undoing dejure segregation had been achieved. A simple requirement
of integration would have applied, of course, to the racially separate
schools of the North and West as well as to those of the South; it would
have required racial balance, not merely undoing the effects of segrega-
tion; and it would have had no time limit. That, however, was hardly po-
litically feasible. The North and West would have joined the South in a
nationally-unified protest that would have compelled Congress and the
president to intervene. 6 Instead, it seemed the North and West had noth-
ing to fear from this requirement of desegregation, and the South, in the
opinion of the North and West at the time, no doubt deserved whatever
the good justices were proposing to do to it.
Second, calling the requirement "desegregation" excused the Court
from the impossible task of justifying compulsory integration in terms of
expected benefits. The Court's answer to the question as to why it was
requiring integration was that there was no such requirement; the only
requirement was desegregation in compliance with Brown.'7
Third, and closely related to obviating the need to justify compul-
sory race-mixing, calling the requirement "desegregation" enabled the
Court to overcome the huge obstacle apparently presented by Brown.
Instead of undertaking the further impossible task of having to distin-
guish or qualify Brown's apparent prohibition of all official racial dis-
crimination, the Court could wrap itself in the protective mantle of
Brown and claim to actually be enforcing it. No one, of course, could be
opposed to enforcing Brown.
It is true that "desegregation" would require race discrimination, al-
though the Court never quite put it that way. Such race discrimination
would only be required in order to enforce Brown's prohibition of it-a
matter of fighting fire with fire. The de jure-de facto distinction was so
essential as the Court's only justification for permitting or requiring
16. The threat of interdistrict busing in the Detroit metropolitan area led to segregationist Gov-
ernor George Wallace of Alabama winning the 1972 Democratic presidential primary in Michigan.
See generally Anthony Walton, American Histories: Chasing Dreams and Nightmares; In Making
Myths, Betraying Our Past, N.Y. TIMES, Aug; 5, 2000, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C07E3DF 1331 F930A I 5757COA9669C8B63&sec =
&spon=&pagewanted=2.
17. See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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racial discrimination by school districts that the Court stuck to it even
when ordering racial balancing in school districts of the North and West
which never had de jure segregation. One specific example occurred
with Denver's school district in Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1.8 The Court
in Keyes continued to claim that the requirement was not integration but
"desegregation" which required the Court to perform the charade of first
purporting to find that Denver's schools were dejure segregated.' 9 The
very liberal school board was found, incredibly, to have racially dis-
criminated in order to segregate, when in fact it had practiced race dis-
crimination only to integrate. 20 A final advantage for the Court of calling
the requirement "desegregation" was that it made it appear consistent
with the 1964 Civil Rights Act's requirement of "desegregation." In fact,
the two requirements were precise opposites, because the Court required
race discrimination while the Act forbids it.
2'
B. Disadvantages of De Jure-De Facto
The Court's de jure-de facto distinction also had major disadvan-
tages, as noted above. The most significant disadvantage was that the
distinction was merely a ruse because the Court did not observe it in
what it ordered done. It was not true that race discrimination was being
required, as the Court claimed.22 Each succeeding case after Green made
it more clear that integration was being ordered for its own sake and
could not be justified as only undoing segregation. As Justice Powell
pointed out in his concurring opinion in Keyes,23 the busing for racial
18. See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189 (1973).
19. Id. at 195-200 ("The only other question" was whether the lower courts erred in failing to
find de jure segregation in Denver's "core area.").
20. Denver's "desegregation" troubles were entirely due to its liberal school board's excessive
commitment to integration. The board culminated a series of efforts to increase integration with
resolutions requiring two-way (whites into black areas as well as blacks into white) cross-district
busing. After pro-busing members were promptly voted out of office, the new board rescinded the
resolutions before they could be implemented. This, a totally confused federal district judge con-
cluded, converted the formerly constitutional racial separation ("de facto segregation") into dejure
segregation. See GRAGLIA, supra note 2, at 162-63.
21. Title IV of the 1964 Act defines "desegregation" as "the assignment of students to public
schools. . . without regard to their race .... " and "not . . . the assignment of students to public
schools in order to overcome racial imbalance." 42 USC 2000d, § 401(b) (2000).
22. See Green, 391 U.S. 430; see also Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974) ("But the
remedy is necessarily designed, as all remedies are, to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct
to the position they would have occupied in the absence of such conduct.")
23. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 220-24 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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balance ordered in Swann 24 could not be justified as "desegregation" as
the majority of the Court had claimed,25 because the racial separation
that existed in the schools of Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina in
1971 was not different from the separation that existed in the schools of
the North and West. In both areas, the separation was the result of non-
racial neighborhood assignments of students in districts with areas of
residential racial concentration.26
"Desegregation" was obviously a ruse, a cover for a requirement of
integration that could not be admitted, and it enabled the Court to claim it
was enforcing Brown. It could therefore be limited to the South and did
not have to be otherwise explained. Even more clearly, the distinction is
invalid as a matter of policy because the benefits, if any, and costs of
compulsory integration would not seem to depend on the cause of the
separation that is being overcome. If compulsory racial integration is
sound social policy, it should be sound wherever racial separation exists.
III. PROHIBITING THE USE OF DISCRIMINATION
TO INCREASE INTEGRATION
Even though the creation of the de jure-de facto distinction to jus-
tify a requirement of race discrimination to increase integration was a
fraud, there is a certain justice in it being used in Parents Involved to
prohibit race discrimination for the same purpose. Parents Involved can
be seen as an example, in the familiar phrase, of chickens coming home
to roost. The Court's claim that it permitted (or required) racial discrimi-
nation only to "remedy" race discrimination, in compliance with, rather
than in violation of, Brown's prohibition, left that permission vulnerable
to being withdrawn and the prohibition reinstated by the simple expedi-
ent of taking the claim seriously and pointing out that in a given case
there was no discrimination to be remedied.
The ease with which the dejure-defacto distinction could be used
to prohibit, rather than permit or require, race discrimination was first
illustrated by the Court's decision in Milliken in 1974.27 Desegregation
was required in the overwhelmingly black Detroit school district because
24. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
25. See id. at 27-28 (explaining that "'[r]acially neutral' assignment plans... may fail to coun-
teract the continuing effects of past school segregation resulting from the discriminatory location or
distortion of school size.").
26. See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 222-23 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
27. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). See also Bradley v. School Bd., 462 F.2d 1058
(4th Cir. 1972), aff'd412 U.S. 92 (1973).
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dejure segregation was supposedly (although falsely) 28 found there. De-
segregation could not be required, however, in a much larger, predomi-
nantly white area including Detroit and surrounding school districts be-
cause there had been no finding of inter-district de jure segregation. A
requirement based on a deception could be converted into a prohibition,
not by exposing the deception, but by pretending to take it seriously. The
result is the worst of both worlds: busing for "racial balance" in majority
black urban school districts where majority white schools (the real objec-
tive of "desegregation") are not possible, but not in wider areas where
they are possible.
This brings us back to Parents Involved and the question with
which we started: How can a school district be constitutionally required
to take steps to increase integration one day and constitutionally prohib-
ited from doing so the next? The answer, we can now see, is simple and
unavoidable. As Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy carefully and
repeatedly explained, it is the necessary result of the crucial de jure-de
facto distinction:
[O]n the first day, the Louisville school district was required to use
race discrimination because it was necessary to remedy dejure seg-
regation, but on the second day-after the district was declared
"unitary," free of the effects of the past segregation-it was prohib-
ited from using race discrimination because there was no longer any
29dejure segregation to be remedied.
Without dejure segregation to remedy, the use of race discrimina-
tion in school assignments would be simply for the purpose of seeking
racial balance, and that is not only not constitutionally required, but as
Justice Powell pointed out in Regents of University of California v
Bakke,30 "facially invalid" as "discrimination for its own sake.",31 It is
true that in addition to its use as a remedy, race discrimination may be
used, Grutter v. Bollinger told us, to achieve an overall, many-element
diversity in the university context.32 But that is only because First
28. See GRAGLIA, supra note 2, at 204-06 (explaining how the Detroit school board, like Den-
ver's, was actually committed to increasing integration by, for example, holding teacher positions
open to be filled only by blacks).
29. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2761
(2007) ("The distinction between segregation by state action and racial imbalance caused by other
factors has been central to our jurisprudence in this area for generations.").
30. 438 U.S. 265 (1978)
31. Id. at 307.
32. 539 U.S. 306, 326-29 (2003).
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Amendment considerations are involved and achieving many-element
diversity on the basis of individual consideration of each applicant is
necessary for effective higher education. The Parents Involved cases,
however, involved only a grade school context and race was the only
element of diversity that the schools sought.
While Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy insisted that the
dissenters simply failed to understand the importance of the de jure-de
facto distinction to the law of race discrimination,33 the chief difference
between the two sides probably lies elsewhere. A cynic might suggest-
indeed, at the Brown conference Professor Paul Finkelman 34 uncharita-
bly suggested-that the real difference is that only the dissenters are
truly committed to the cause of racial equality and therefore willing to
uphold any practice or activity supposedly directed to advancing that
cause. 35 A more likely explanation is a fundamental difference in views
as to the long-term effects in our multiracial society of an official gov-
ernment policy of race discrimination, classifying individuals by race for
differing treatment.
The dissenters in Parents Involved are surely correct that there is an
important difference between official race discrimination meant to segre-
gate and discrimination meant to integrate the races. Plessy v. Ferguson
36
failed to see that segregation is necessarily a denial of equal treatment to
a minority, if for no other reason than the difference in numbers. Con-
finement to, say, 13 percent of the population, as in the case of blacks, is
not equal to confinement to 87 percent. Differences in wealth and social
status between blacks and whites in the American context make the ine-
quality even greater. If political equality is the objective, such discrimina-
tion separating the races must, as Brown held,37 be prohibited.
That compulsory segregation is inconsistent with political and so-
cial equality is reason to prohibit it in a system that professes equality.
However, it does not follow that going beyond a prohibition of race dis-
33. Parents, 127 S. Ct. at 2761 ("'Where resegregation is a product not of state action but of
private choices, it does not have constitutional implications.' The dissent elides this distinction be-
tween dejure and defacto segregation[.]") (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 n.14
(1977)).
34. Professor Paul Finkelman is a professor at Albany Law School. He is a President McKinley
Distinguished Professor of Law and Public Policy and Senior Fellow at the Government Law Center.
Professor Finkelman participated in the February PICS Symposium with the author.
35. Statement made by Paul Finkelman at the Brown Undone? symposium held at Seattle
University School of Law.
36. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
37. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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crimination to segregate and moving towards a requirement of race dis-
crimination to increase integration is a step in the direction of equality. It
is difficult to state useful general principles, but a prohibition of all offi-
cial race discrimination may be as close to one as we can come. It may
be that only a total and near-absolute prohibition of official race dis-
crimination can take on a moral quality similar to "natural law" that may
be necessary to make the prohibition effective and secure. As Alexander
Bickel and Philip Kurland famously put it:
For a least a generation the lesson of the great decisions of this
Court and the lesson of contemporary history have been the same:
discrimination on the basis of race is illegal, immoral, unconstitu-
tional, inherently wrong and destructive of democratic society. Now
this is to be unlearned and we are told that this is not a matter of
fundamental principle but only a matter of whose ox is gored.38
In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,39 Justices Scalia and Tho-
mas forcefully expressed the view that the long-range consequences of
official race discrimination should proscribe its use "despite," in Justice
O'Connor's phrase, "the surface appeal of holding 'benign' racial clarifi-
cations to a lower standard., 40 Rejecting the use of race preference in
government contracting, Scalia stated:
To pursue the concept of racial entitlement--even for the most ad-
mirable and benign of purposes-is to reinforce and preserve for fu-
ture mischief the way of thinking that produced race slavery, race
privilege and race hatred.4'
Justice Thomas was, if anything, even more forceful. Responding to Jus-
tice Stevens' contrary view, he stated:
I believe that there is a "moral [and] constitutional equivalence,"...
between laws designed to subjugate a race and those that distribute
benefits on the basis of race in order to foster some current notion of
equality.
42
He then spelled out the basis for the belief in some detail in a statement
worth quoting at length:
38. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 133 (1975).
39. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995).
40. Id. (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A, Carson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 492 (1989) (O'Connor
plurality opinion)).
41. Id. at 239.
42. Id. at 240-41.
20081
Seattle University Law Review
Purchased at the price of immeasurable human suffering, the equal
protection principle reflects our Nation's understanding that such
classifications ultimately have a destructive impact on the individ-
ual and our society. Unquestionably, "[i]nvidious [racial] discrimi-
nation is an engine of oppression," . . . . It is also true that
"[r]emedial" racial preferences may reflect "a desire to foster equal-
ity in society," ..... But there can be no doubt that racial paternal-
ism and its unintended consequences can be as poisonous and per-
nicious as any other form of discrimination. So-called "benign" dis-
crimination teaches many that because of chronic and apparently
immutable handicaps, minorities cannot compete with them without
their patronizing indulgence. Inevitably, such programs engender at-
titudes of superiority or, alternatively, provoke resentment among
those who believe that they have been wronged by the govern-
ment's use of race. These programs stamp minorities with a badge
of inferiority and may cause them to develop dependencies or to
adopt an attitude that they are "entitled" to preferences.43
The strength of Brown, and the reason it led to the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, was Congress's understanding that it established an absolute
prohibition of official race discrimination.4 4 The result was to inculcate,
through the educative capacity of law, the ideal that race is unimportant.
One enormous advantage was to make legally irrelevant the contentious
and divisive question of possible group-wide racial differences. The offi-
cial use of race discrimination, regardless of its purpose, inculcates the
opposite view: that race is so important that government may properly
classify and deal with individuals as members of racial groups entitled to
differing treatment. The result requires individuals to organize into racial
and ethnic groups, as is now universally occurring, 45 to fight for group
racial advantage and defend against disadvantage. Acceptance as official
government policy of the view that race is important cannot be the road
to greater integration; it would seem, rather, a renunciation of hope for an
integrated multiracial society.
The Parents Involved decision is indeed paradoxical and irrational,
but only because all of the Court's compulsory integration decisions be-
43. Id.
44. See GRAGLIA, supra note 2, at 48 (Congressman Emanuel Celler of New York, floor man-
ager of the bill in the House, stated that the act's prohibition of all official race discrimination
"would simply implement the law of the land" as declared in Brown).
45. Congress and many state legislatures now consider it necessary and appropriate to organize
into a Black Caucus, Hispanic Caucus, and Asian Caucus.
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ginning with Green are dishonest and irrational. The fraudulence of the
de jure-de facto distinction that made the move from prohibiting to re-
quiring race discrimination possible also makes possible a return to the
prohibition by simply treating the distinction as valid. Parents Involved
takes the Court that decided Green at its word that race discrimination is
permissible, consistent with (indeed required by) Brown, only when used
to remedy segregation. Surely, taking the Court at its word is commend-
able, even if hypocritical. The result is to limit the use of official race
discrimination, which is almost surely a step in the right direction in a
multiracial society.
IV. CONCLUSION
Whether overturning results reached in the ordinary political proc-
ess is a step the Court is justified in taking in our supposed governmental
system of representative democracy is a different question. If the Court's
intervention is justified, it is not because its decision in Parents Involved
is mandated by the Constitution. It is not. It can only be because if the
Court was authorized to intervene in Brown, which no one will deny, to
create a constitutional prohibition of all official race discrimination, it
must be authorized to continue to intervene to enforce it.
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